A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

41. In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply firstInterpolation: “with ever primacy that does not include any imperfection. For the part is more imperfect than the whole and yet is prior; for a part shares in the entity of the whole and is not itself the whole. But there are other primacies that do not include any imperfection, as the primacy of eminence and of triple causal independence, namely, efficient cause, formal or exemplar cause, and final cause. But the primacy of eminence is not the primacy of causality; for one being is not the cause of another from the fact that it is preeminent over it, for the first and the supreme in any genus is preeminent over any other posterior in that genus and yet it is not the cause of it. Also exemplar primacy is not distinguished from the primacy of efficient causality, because a principle that is the exemplar of other things in intelligible being is only an efficient principle through the intellect; for just as a natural efficient cause does not distinguish efficient causality but is contained under it, so neither is the exemplar cause distinguished from the efficient cause. So there are two causalities, distinct from each other, namely of efficient causality and final causality. And all those primacies that we attribute to God do not include any imperfection. - Hence first I will show that there exists something in fact among beings that is simply first.” ⁶⁵ in efficient causality, and that there is also something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature only such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.

42. [First partial article] - The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, because of the triple primacy; but each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists in reality. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal conclusions.

43. Now the first conclusion of these nine is as follows, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor can it, by virtue of something other than itself, cause an effect. The proof is that some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine On the Trinity 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let this something else be a. If a is first in the way expounded [n.43 init.], I have the proposition intended; if it is not first, then it is effective derivatively, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted.To deny that a thing cannot be an effect or cause an effect by virtue of another is to assert that it can be an effect and cause an effect by virtue of another. ⁶⁶ Let that other be granted and let it be b, about which one argues as was argued about a, and thus either one proceeds ad infinitum, where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is discordant.Interpolation: “because then the same thing would be prior and posterior to itself.” ⁶⁷

44. Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first,Interpolation: “because it seeks a stand in causes.” ⁶⁸ that according to philosophizers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations,Interpolation: “none of which is first but each is second, because according to them an infinite process is not discordant in the case of productions of the same nature.” ⁶⁹ where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.

45. Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.Interpolation: “likewise, it proceeds from contingents, because it proceeds from the ideas of producer and produced, which are only contingent terms.” ⁷⁰

46. To exclude the first instance [n.44] I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in Metaphysics 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

47. And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and causes that are accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes per se and per accidens, and another to speak of causes per se that are essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with another, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause per se causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to itInterpolation: “as the subject is the per se cause with respect to its own property, even in other cases, as ‘the white disperses [sight]’ and ‘the builder builds’.” ⁷¹ and a cause per accidens is the reverse;Interpolation: “as ‘Polycleitus builds’.” ⁷² in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.

48. And causes that are per se or essentially ordered differ from causes that are per accidens or accidentally ordered in three ways.

49. The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second depends for its causing on the first, but not in per accidens ordered causes, even though the second is dependent in existence or in something else.Interpolation: “for although the son depends for his existence on his father, yet he does not so depend in causing, because he can act when his father is dead just as when his father is alive.” ⁷³

50. The second difference is that in per se ordered causes there is causality of a second nature and a second order, because the superior cause is more perfect, but this is not the case in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends for its causing on a cause of the same nature, because in the causing of something one thing of one nature is enough.

51. The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and per se are necessarily required simultaneously for the causing, otherwise some essential and per se causality would be lacking for the effect; but it is not so in the case of accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.Interpolation: “because any cause has its own perfect causality without any respect of its effect; for it is enough that one cause successively causes after the other.” Interpolation: “From the three differences come three reasons: from the first, that the totality of causes is dependent in causing, therefore dependent on something that is not part of the totality; from the second, that the infinitely superior will be infinitely more perfect; from the third, that infinite things are actual all at once. There is an additional fourth reason which proves that a possible thing which does not include imperfection is already shown to be in existence. - But if an essential order is denied, because an accidental order is sufficient for the sense, on the contrary I give this proof: a is being caused by something; a nature that can be produced in one supposit can be produced in any supposit; so the reason by which it is now in this supposit is reason that it was before in that supposit and in that other supposit. No succession of things goes on continually save by virtue of something permanent; that permanent thing is no part of the succession; therefore besides the individual in the species doing the generating there is some other superior agent. - From this result I infer that that agent is the surpassing first thing, because an equivocal agent is more actual and independent and that on which the other things depend. It is the first end, because there is some end on account of which it per se acts, Physics 25.196b17-22; not on account of any of the effects other than itself, because these are less good. Likewise, nothing else does it naturally or by reason most of all love. Fourth, it is the first exemplar thing because it is a per se agent; so either it acts for an end that it knows or for an end it is directed to by something that knows; also it knows everything that can be made, because it orders them to the end and wills them for the end. Solution to the second question: there are not two supereminent things. - Again, there are always as many essential features, hence and thence and in different species, as there are coordinate orderings, because they do not have one idea here and there, nor here to one and there to two first totalities. Note the process of this solution, which is as follows: the first conclusion is that there is some first efficient thing; this conclusion is first proved in a confused way [n.43], second in a distinct way (through the three propositions [nn.53-55], the first of which is proved after five manners [n.53]), and two instances against it are ruled out [nn.44-46, 56]. The second conclusion is that the first thing cannot be caused [n.57]. The third conclusion: thus the first thing is actually existent [n.58]. Hence follow three similar conclusions about the first end [nn.60-62]. Hence three similar ones about the first supreme thing [nn.64-66]. Hence, that the first efficient cause is first in two other ways; two conclusions follow [nn.68-69]. Hence, that thus the first thing is one nature; which is shown in four ways, namely because it necessarily exists, because it is highest, because it is ultimate end, because it is the termination of dependency [nn.70-73]. In the second principal article the preliminaries are first proved, and there are three conclusions [nn.75, 89, 98; a fourth conclusion in n.105]; hence, that the first thing has intelligence and will, by three reasons [nn.76-79]; hence that its understanding itself is the same as its essence [n.89]; hence, that no understanding is an accident of it, by four reasons [nn.98-101]. Hence is the principal intention proved, namely infinity; first, through efficient causality, by treatment of Aristotle’s reason in Physics 8.10.266a10-24, b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, [nn.111-124]; second, through actual knowledge of infinites [nn.125-127] and, in line with this, by an argument about intuitive knowledge of effects [nn.128-129]; third, through the idea of the end [n.130]; fourth, through the idea of preeminence [nn.131-139].” ⁷⁴

52. These points make the proposed conclusion clear, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. - Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called a, the second b, and the third c.

53. Proof of the three propositions.

First a, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first thatInterpolation: “in essentially ordered causes, where the adversary posits an infinity of them, a second cause, insofar as it causes, depends on a first (from the first difference [n.49]). So if there were an infinity of causes, things are such that not only any later cause but any cause at all depends on its own immediate cause, therefore etc.” ⁷⁵ the totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality.Interpolation: “and this thing I call the first efficient cause. So if there are infinite causes, they still depend on some other cause that is not part of the totality.” ⁷⁶ Second that an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51],Interpolation [replacing the second argument in the text]: “if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes were to come together in the production of some effect, and if, from the third difference [n.51], all essentially ordered causes exist together at once, it follows that an infinite number of things exist together at once in causing this effect.” ⁷⁷ which no philosopher has posited. - Next, third, that the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. - Next, fourth, that the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because anything of this latter sort causes imperfectly, as being dependent in causing on another cause. - Next, fifth, that an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection.Interpolation: “because what involves no imperfection can be supposed to exist without imperfection among things.” ⁷⁸ But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and this nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is a made plain.

54. Proof of b [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on the prior in causing; for it can cause when the prior does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deform-ness is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same nature;Interpolation: “and because no part of a succession can persist along with the whole succession, for then it would not be part of the succession.” ⁷⁹ but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another form of order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession.Interpolation: “Everything therefore that depends on a cause accidentally ordered depends more essentially on a cause per se and essentially ordered; nay rather, when an essential order is denied the accidental order will be denied, because accidents do not have an order save by means of something fixed and permanent, nor consequently are they multiplied to infinity.” [In other words, an infinite series of accidentally ordered causes must at least have an abiding matter underlying it, and this matter will underlie it as a per se and essentially ordered cause.] ⁸⁰ So b is plain.

55. There is proof too of c [n.52], that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is that since, from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then this nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied if one denies an essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to some other nature.

56. To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43],Interpolation: “when I say ‘some nature has been truly brought about, therefore something is the efficient cause of it’.” ⁸¹ I respond that one might argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but it is manifest. - However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this reasoning is true, ‘some nature is effectible, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is that some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [Prior Analytics 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from necessaries. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion of that of which possibility is being proved now [n.58].

57. The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is that it is an in-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some in-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and anything else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is in-effectible then it is un-causable, because it is not causable by an end, or by matter, or by form. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by an end, is that the final cause only causes because the final cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to bringing about its effect, for the entity of a thing with an end does not in any other way depend on the end as on something prior; but nothing is a cause per se unless the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. - Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by matter or by form, are proved together because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause implies perfection without any imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily implies some imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the nature of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the nature of an intrinsic cause. So once the prior is denied so is the posterior. - The same consequences are also proved by the fact that intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, whether in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. - From these statements the second conclusion is plain.

58. The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and some nature is truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. Its proof: if that to whose nature it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the nature of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for a was set down [n.53], which proof seems to establish too little and yet it establishes this. But the other proofs for that very a [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of a, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be from itself. But what is not from itself cannot be from itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. - This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is discordant.

59. In accord with the three conclusions shown about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary, that it contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else’s being prior, thus, to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as in the preceding [n.58]; for un-causability is most included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.

60. In accord with the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause.

Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].

61. The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is that every per se agent acts for an end, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no per se efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the per accidens be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting per accidens, which are chance and fortune, that according to Aristotle, Physics 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting per se as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect and deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is no per se agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is no end there is no per se agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what is causable by an end is excelled in goodness by the end and consequently in perfection, - and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].

62. The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].

63. A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that a prior being is impossible, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].

64. To the three conclusions about both orders of extrinsic causality I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence.

Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because an order among essences is essential, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].

65. The second conclusion is that a supreme nature is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, from the points preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is in-effectible and, further, therefore un-causable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about efficient causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is in-effectible is proved because every effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of b itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; but an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.

66. The third conclusion is that a supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].

67. Corollary: that there be some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; the proof is like the corollary about the effective thing and the end [nn.59, 63].

68. [Second partial article] - As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.Cf. Averroes Metaphysics 10 com.7, 12 com.6: “the formal, final, and moving principles are not three in number, but one in subject and three in idea.” ⁸² The proof is that every efficient cause per se acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.Interpolation: “For if it were to act per se for an end other than itself, then there would be something more noble than the first efficient cause, because an end which is something separate from the agent intending the end is more noble than the agent.” ⁸³

69. Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is that the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but is equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is most eminent.

70. [Third partial article] - As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion.

Now the preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is that it is through and through un-causable, for there is a contradiction involved in something’s being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all;     therefore it is altogether un-causable. From this I argue: a thing cannot not be unless there is something positively or privatively incompossible with it that can be; but in the case of that which is from itself and is through and through un-causable there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore etc     . The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively incompossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that incompossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if it can be from itself and it is from itself, then two incompossible things will be at the same time, or neither of them exists, because each destroys the being of the other; if it can be from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.

71. Further, to the intended proposition, there is proof from this of the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons.

First in this way, that if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called a and b. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are,Interpolation: “and, beside this, those two natures are formally necessary through that in which they agree.” ⁸⁴ then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons per se includes the other, each of the natures, when taken separately, would be necessarily existent.Interpolation: “through the other nature, and so there would be something necessarily existent that is no less necessarily existent when the thing through which it is so has been taken away [n.177].” ⁸⁵ But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither one of them is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither of them is included in necessary existence, because whatever is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.Interpolation: “because necessary existence includes nothing that is not necessarily existent or the reason for necessarily existing [n.177].” ⁸⁶

72. The second proof is that there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; therefore neither can there be two first effective things. The proof of the antecedent is that species are related as numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.

73. This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because if there were two ultimate ends, they would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings here would have no order to those beings there, because they would have no order to the end of those beings either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another end, because there cannot be two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing; for then something would be in some order a per se cause such that, when it was not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. - There is also a general confirmation of this, that there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some one and the same thing, because then a thing would be the term of a dependence such that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore there cannot be two natures that are the first terms of other things according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has that triple primacy.